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exclusive market control. This would tend to accelerate the decrease in

American exports compared to imports. 54
In contrast, the test of final operable assembly appears to be oriented
more toward the public good since it allows competition for world mar-

kets; with competition comes technological advancement. Under this test,
a manufacturer competing with the patent holder may export his product

without penalty by leaving it in an incomplete, inoperable condition. It
leaves intact the patent holder's domestic rights but does not extend his
monopoly into world trade. The monopoly granted to the patent holder

within the United States is by itself a sufficient reward.
JOHN

C.

BALDWIN

"NOTICE TO THE CORPORATION" AND THE
UNDATED RESIGNATION
The resignation of a director of a private corporation can lead to
numerous legal problems. For example, the corporation may seek to deny

the validity of service of process made on a resigned director,t the resigned
director may defend against liability for acts of the corporation on the
grounds of his resignation, 2 or there may be a question as to the existence
of a quorum on the board during a particular vote. 3 The validity of a

resignation may depend on such factors as the motive behind the resignation,4 the director's post-resignation conduct, 5 or the form of notice given
to the corporation.' A recent federal case, Dillon v. Berg,7 introduced a

new factor which may increase the difficulty in determining the validity
of a director's resignation.
5
n 1960, the excess of exports over imports was $5.9 billion. By 1969, this excess had
declined to $1.9 billion. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1970 777 (91st ed. 1970). For the period from January through August,

1971, imports exceeded exports by 1.4 billion dollars. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct.

It, 1971, at 89.
'See, e.g., Venner v. Denver Union Water Co., 40 Colo. 212, 90 P. 623 (1907).
2
See. e.g., Zimmerman v. Western & Southern Fire Ins. Co., 121 Ark. 408, 181 S.W.
283 (1915).
3
See, e.g., Seal of Gold Mining Co. v. Slater- 161 Cal. 621, 120 P. 15 (1911).
'See, e.g., Zeltner v. Henry Zeltner Brewing Co., 174 N.Y. 247, 66 N.E. 810 (1903).
See also In re Caplan, 20 App. Div. 2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 14 N.Y.2d
679, 198 N.E.2d 908, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964).
5
See, e.g., In re Fidelity Assurance Ass'n, 42 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. W. Va. 1941).
'See Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891). See also B.F. Goodrich Rubber Co. v.
Helena Motor Car Co., 53 Mont. 526, 165 P. 454 (1917).
7326 F. Supp. 1214 (D. Del. 1971).
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F. Steven Berg was the Chairman of the Board of Scotten, Dillon
Company, a Delaware corporation. Berg informed Ralph R. Power, a
director, that he would oppose Powers's re-election to the Board unless
Power gave him an undated letter of resignation. The seven-man board
was divided into two factions over a proposed merger with another company which Berg had founded. Power held the deciding vote, and when
he supplied Berg with the undated letter,' he effectively gave Berg the
ability to thwart opposition to the merger and other policies. Berg did not
disclose the letter's existence until Power changed his mind and wrote him
a second letter, 9 copies of which were sent to the other board members,
withdrawing the resignation. The record indicated that Berg then sent the
resignation letter, which he dated ten days before the withdrawal letter,
along with his acknowledgement, which he dated four days before the
withdrawal, to the other directors. Power continued to attend meetings
but was not seated as a director.
The Berg faction elected a replacement for Power which gave Berg
virtually unfettered control of the corporation. Thus it became essential
to the opponents of the merger and other policies of Berg to contest the
validity of the resignation which led to this replacement or else face repeated defeats in the board meetings.
The Delaware statute requires written notice for a director's resignation." The court held in Dillon that this means "actual written notice to
each and every member of the Board of Directors or actual written notice
to an agent of the corporation. .

. .""

In most other jurisdictions

the

statute is based on or is similar to section 36 of the Model Business
'The text of the first letter was:
Gentlemen:
I herewith tender my resignation as a Director of Scotten, Dillon
Company effective immediately.
Id. at 1222 n.7.
'The text of the second letter was:
Prior to the meeting of the Board of Directors on Monday, March 9,
you demanded and received my undated resignation from the Board. Upon
careful consideration I am herewith withdrawing that resignation and will
continue to serve as a director.
Id. at 1222.
"'The statute reads in part:
Each director shall hold office until his successor is elected and qualified
or until his earlier resignation or removal. Any director may resign at any
time upon written notice to the corporation.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (Supp. 1970).
"326 F. Supp. at 1224.
"2Two other states have statutory provisions requiring written notice. KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-3101 (1963); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-3 (1969). Statutes in other jurisdictions are
based on or similar to the Model Act. The relevant sections are: ALA. CODE tit. 10, § 220
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Corporation Act and does not require written notice, but merely provides
that the director shall serve for "the term for which he is elected and until
his successor shall have been elected and qualified."' 3 Such a provision 4
has been held to embody the common law requirement that some form
of notice must be given to the corporation, though it need not be in
writing.'" Thus, whether statute or common law controls, notice is required.
The Dillon court held that the undated letter of resignation which
Power gave to Berg did not give notice of his resignation to the corporation at the time it was submitted and therefore did not meet the statutory
requirement. 6 According to the court, the transaction between Power and
(1958); ALASKA STAT. § 10.10.120 (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-302 (Repl. Vol. 1966);
CAL. CORP. CODE § 805 (West 1955); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-5-2 (1963); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 30-139 (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.34 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-208(d) (Repl. Vol. 1970); IOwA CODE ANN. § 496A.35 (Supp. 1971);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 54 (Repl. Vol. 1966); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 158, § 19
(1970); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.13 (Rev. Vol. 1963); MIss. CODE ANN. § 5309-72 (Supp.
1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.315 (1966); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 15-2234 (Repl. Vol.
1967); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2036 (Reissue 1970); NEv. REV. STAT. § 78.330 (1967); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 51-24-35 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 703(b) (McKinney 1963);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-25(d) (Supp. 1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19-37 (1960); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 57.185 (1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1401 (Supp. 1971); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 7-1.1-34 (Supp. 1970); S.D. CODE ANN. § 47-5-2 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-804(2)
(Supp. 1970); TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT art. 2.32 (1956); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-34 (Repl.
Vol. 1962); 'VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1882 (Supp. 1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-36 (Supp.
1971); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23.01.320 (Supp. 1970); W. 'A. CODE ANN. § 31-1-16(b)
(Supp. 1971); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.32(2) (1957); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.34 (Repl.
Vol. 1965).
'"MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 36 (2d ed. 1971).
112 U.S.C. § 71 (1970) formerly §§ 9-10 of the National Banking Act (1864).
' 5Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891). In addition, notification is enough to effect
a resignation and no action is required on the part of the corporation. Id. at 154. See also
Schuckman v. Rubenstein, 164 F.2d 952 (6th Cir. 1947); Wingate v. Bercut, 146 F.2d 725
(9th Cir. 1944); Fearing v. Glen, 73 F. 116 (2d Cir. 1896); Robinson v. Blood, 151 Cal. 504,
91 P. 258 (1907); San Jose Say. Bank v. Sierra Land Co., 63 Cal. 179 (1883); Mayo v.
Interment Property Inc., 51 Cal. App. 2d 654, 128 P.2d 417 (1942); Security Investors'
Realty Co. v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. App. 450, 281 P. 709 (1929); Lincoln Court Realty
Co. v. Kentucky Title Say. Bank & Trust Co., 169 Ky. 840, 185 S.W. 156 (1916); Marine
Forwarding & Shipping Co. v. Barone, 154 So. 2d 528 (La. App. 1963); Manhattan Co. v.
Kaldenberg, 165 N.Y. 1,58 N.E. 790 (1900); Chandler v. Hoag, 2 Hun 613 (Sup. Ct. 1874),
affd, 63 N.Y. 624 (1874); Harry Levi & Co. v. Feldman, 61 N.Y.S.2d 639 (Sup. Ct. 1946);
Wilson v. Brentwood Hotel Co., 16 Misc. 48, 37 N.Y.S. 655 (Sup. Ct. 1896). But see Young
v. Janas, 34 Del. Ch. 287, 103 A.2d 299 (Del. Ch. 1954); Lippman v. Kehoe Stenograph
Co., II Del. Ch. 190, 98 A. 943 (Del. Ch. 1916); Colorado Debenture Corp. v. Lombard
Inv. Co., 66 Kan. 251, 71 P. 584 (1903); Timolat v. S.J. Held Co., 17 Misc. 556,40 N.Y.S.
692 (Sup. Ct. 1896).
16326 F. Supp. at 1224.
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Berg "amounted to a covert agreement between the two in which Berg
consented to support Power's reelection to the Board . . .in exchange for
Berg obtaining the right to remove Power at any time, without cause."'1
Presumably this right would be exercised in the event Power did not
support Berg's policies. Thus, Berg was acting in his own interests in
obtaining the undated letter of resignation and not in the interest of the
corporation. "Therefore [this transaction did] not constitute 'notice to the
corporation' as required by [the Delaware statute] '"'
Normally, notice to one director would be notice to the corporation,
for the director, as agent, is presumed to communicate this notice to his
principal, the corporation. 9 This is especially true where the agent is the
president or chairman of the board.2" However, as the court noted, this
presumption fails when the director has an interest in the subject that is
"substantially adverse to the corporation,"' 2 and therefore his knowledge
is not attributable to the corporation.22 The interest must be so adverse
as to "practically . . .destroy the agency or to render it reasonably
probable that an ordinary person .. . [due to the] incompatibility in
interests, will withhold such knowledge from [the corporation]." 23 The
court does not explain Berg's adverse interest, but rather seems to equate
a "substantially adverse interest" with a private interest. It is difficult to
see how the existence of a private interest could always be said to "destroy
the agency" as Dillon seems to indicate.
Perhaps sensing this weakness, the court considered the agreement
between Power and Berg, finding that it "was void and unenforceable
under Delaware law."'24 Simply stated, Power's undated letter was not a
resignation at all but was rather the creation of an authority in Berg to
tender Power's resignation in consideration for Berg's support in the
election. The court somewhat blurs the distinction between a resignation
and an authorization to tender a resignation. Apparently the court felt
that when the letter was tendered it did not constitute a resignation because it was not "notice to the corporation." But neither party intended
that the letter would constitute a resignation when it was submitted to
Berg. The letter was only intended to be evidence of a later resignation
which Berg was authorized to tender at his discretion. As the court correctly held, 25 such authorization in this instance is tantamount to vesting
'7ld.
18Id.

"13 W. FLETCHER,

PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

§ 790 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1965).

-1ld. § 811.
21326 F. Supp. at 1224 (emphasis added). See also 3 W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 819 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1965).
22American Nat'l Bank v. Miller, 229 U.S. 517 (1913); 3 W. FLETCHER, PRIvATE
CORPORATIONS §§ 789-90 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1965).
2Goldstein v. Union Nat'l Bank, 109 Tex. 555, 213 S.W. 584, 591 (1919).
p326 F. Supp. at 1224.
mId.
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removal power in one who is not authorized to hold such power. 26 The
letter authorizing Berg to tender Power's resignation effectively allowed
Berg to remove him unilaterally without cause, a power which is not

available to the board of directors by most statutes27 nor by decisions in
Delaware. 2s The Model Act is typical of the statutes, specifically including
a clause to protect the minority's directors elected through cumulative

voting.29 Several states allow the corporation to specify a procedure for
removal in the articles of incorporation or in the bylaws." Two states,
Massachusetts and Oklahoma, allow the directors to remove a member

of the board, but this power is severely limited to specific instances or for
31

cause.
If such restrictions did not exist, the board could frustrate the will of
the shareholders, especially the minority, by removing a duly elected
director. The value of cumulative voting would be completely destroyed
"Feldman v. Pennroad Corp., 60 F. Supp. 716 (D. Del. 1945), affd 155 F.2d 773 (3d
Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 808 (1947); Burch v. National Guarantee Credit Corp.,
13 Del. Ch. 180, 116 A. 738 (Del. Ch. 1922); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 39, Comment
(2d ed. 1971); 2 W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 357 (rev. vol. 1969).
2r'he following states have statutory provisions similar to the Model Act: COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 31-5-5 (1963); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-706 (Rev. Vol. 1969); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 496A.35 (Supp. 1970); MISS. CODE ANN. § 5309-75 (Supp. 1968); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 351.315(2) (1966); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2039 (Reissue 1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:66 (1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-24-38 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 706
(McKinney 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-27 (Supp. 1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19-40
(1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701-58(B)-(C) (Baldwin 1971); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 57.193 (1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1405 (Supp. 1971); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12 18.7 (1962); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-37 (Supp. 1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-42 (Repl.
Vol. 1964); WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.380 (Supp. 1967).
These states also reserve control to the shareholders: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-304 (Repl.
Vol. 1966); CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 810 (West 1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-139(4)
(1967); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 52(d) (Repl. Vol. 1966); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.13(3)
(Rev. Vol. 1963); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.29 (1969); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.335 (1967);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-807 (Supp. 1971).
2'Everett v. Transnation Dev. Corp., Del. Ch. _
267 A.2d 627 (Del. Ch. 1970);
Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Automatic Steel Prod. Inc., 39 Del. Ch. 93, 159 A.2d 288
(Del. Ch. 1960); Campbell v. Lowe's Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852 (Del. Ch. 1957).
2'MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 39 (2d ed. 1971) provides in part "Any director or
the entire board of directors may be removed, with or without cause, by a vote of the holders
of a majority of the shares then entitled to vote at an election of directors."
"In Indiana, the articles of incorporation control: IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-208a (Supp.
1971). The bylaws control in these states: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-317(b)(3) (1960);
HAWAII REV. LAWS § 416-80 (1968); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 15-2236 (Supp. 1971);
IV. VA. CODE ANN. § 13-1-20 (1966); VIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.32(3) (1965).
31MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 51 (1970) allows the directors to remove "for
cause." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1.39-.40 (1953) recognizes certain circumstances such
as conviction of a felony or insanity of a director as giving the other directors removal power.
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since a director so elected to protect the minority could easily be removed
by the rest of the board. As the court said in Laughlin v. Geer,32 when it
ruled against an attempt by directors to remove one of their number,
the board of directors may not nullify the . ..right of a shareholder to choose whomsoever he may think proper to represent him
on the board of directors.* ** [To allow the board to remove one
of its members would create] a power most dangerous to the minority stockholders. . ..
Clearly then, policy, as reflected by the statutes and decisions, is
against the board of directors removing a fellow director in any but the
most dire circumstances. If policy is opposed to the board as a whole
removing a director, it must be assumed that policy is even more strongly
opposed to an individual director possessing removal power, and therefore
the agreement giving Berg that power was void.
In addition to Berg's improper attempt to procure removal power,
there is a second basis, not considered by the court, for holding that the
agreement between Berg and Power was void. Just as an attempt to
procure unauthorized removal power is void as opposed to public policy,
an agreement to buy or sell a resignation is also against policy and void
as contra bonos mores." The resignation of a director may not be purchased in order to replace him with one who might not have the shareholders' best interests at heart. Power acted improperly in agreeing to surren36
der control of his office for his own gain.
Such gain need not be pecuniary to void the transaction, though when
it is, the director may be liable to the corporation for his profit.3 7 In
Dillon, Power's gain was the right to hold office until Berg chose to
remove him, and by implication, this right would be terminated if Power
did not support the merger. This is no more acceptable than an outright
money payment, for the result in each instance is that the director no
longer represents the shareholders' interest but rather that of another
director. In Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates,38 the court said that "persons
32121 Ill. App. 534 (1905). See also Burch v. National Guarantee Credit Corp., 13 Del.
Ch. 180, 116 A. 738 (Del. Ch. 1922); Stott v. Stott Realty Co., 246 Mich. 267, 224 N.W.
623 (1929); Raub v. Gerken, 127 App. Div. 42, III N.Y.S. 319 (1908).
3Laughlin v. Geer, 127 III. App. 534, 538 (1905).
"Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962); Forbes v. McDonald,
54 Cal. 98 (1880); Guernsey v. Cook, 120 Mass. 501 (1876); Reed v. Catlett, 228 Mo. App.
109, 68 S.W.2d 734 (1934); Ballentine v. Ferretti, 28 N.Y.S.2d 668, 678-80 (Sup. Ct. 1941);
T.F. Pagel Lumber Co. v. Webster, 231 Wis. 222, 285 N.W. 739 (1939); Koelbel v. Tecktonius, 228 Wis. 317, 280 N.W. 305 (1938).
"Mooney v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 204 F.2d 888, 895 (3d Cir. 1953). See also
2 W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 348 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1969).
uSee Cox v. Berry, 19 Utah 2d 352, 431 P.2d 575 (1967).
3McClure v. Law, 161 N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 388 (1899).
1'305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
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enjoying management control hold it on behalf of the corporation's stockholders, and therefore may not regard it as their own personal property
to dispose of as they wish." 39 The agreement, in which Power had compromised his independent representation of the shareholders in favor of Berg
by selling his resignation to the latter in order to retain his office, was
therefore void on this basis as well.
Thus, there are ample grounds to find that the agreement was void;
however, there is some question as to the necessity and the wisdom of that
holding. The court, despite its "conclusion" that Berg acted to publicize
the resignation letter after he was aware of Power's revocation, found
some "conflict in the evidence as to whether Berg informed the other
'41
directors of Power's resignation before or after Power revoked it."
4
2
Clearly, if Power had revoked the authority before Berg had used it,
Power would retain his seat. If the evidence supported the "conclusion"
that Power revoked first, the court should have allowed the decision to
rest on that basis, for the ultimate holding may be too broad. The opinion,
if taken literally, would void any grant of authority to tender resignation
including those instances where there is no objection which may logically
be raised.
For instance, it was held in Crespinel v. Color Corp. ofAmerica3 that

it is not an illegal and void grant of authority for a director to agree in
advance to tender his resignation upon request of the majority of the
board if such resignation serves a corporate purpose. 4 Further, it was
established in Essex'5 that when the controlling interest in a corporation46
is sold, the sale contract will not be illegal and void simply because it
contains a clause requiring that the existing directors resign in favor of
nominees of the purchaser.4 7 Such contracts were termed "normal and
3

1Id. at 575.
11326 F. Supp. at 1222.
41
Id. at 1224.
"Authority is revocable unless it is coupled with an interest in the property on which
the power is to operate or given as security to insure the performance of a duty or to protect
a title. The authority in question here does not fit into these categories so Power clearly could
revoke it. See Taylor v. Burns, 203 U.S. 120 (1906); Hunt v. Rousmanier's Adm'rs, 21 U.S.
(8 Wheat.) 379 (1823); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 138-39 (1959).
1160 Cal. App. 2d 386, 325 P.2d 565 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
"Id.See also Joseph v. Raff, 82 App. Div. 47, 81 N.Y.S. 546 (1903).
'Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
"A seat on the board may not be sold apart from control, but control does not necessarily mean a majority of the outstanding shares. See note 34-37 supra. In Essex. 28.3% of the
stock was sold and the court held that this constituted control.
"7 Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962). See also In re Caplan,
20 App. Div. 2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913 (Sup. Ct.), affd 14 N.Y.2d 679, 198 N.E.2d 908,

249 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964).
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...desirable" by Judge-Clark in his concurring opinion in Essex." Since
such contracts do involve a grant of authority to resign, they might be
void under Dillon. However, Chief Judge Lumbard said in Essex by way
of dictum that such a contract would be illegal only if it were shown that
there were "circumstances which would have prevented [the purchaser]
from electing a majority of the . . . board of directors in due course." 4
Thus, these exceptions must be recognized in order to prevent the
disruption of a great many transactions, past and future. They may be
distinguished from Dillon on the ground that they are for the ultimate
benefit of the shareholders, while the agreement between Power and Berg
in this case was primarily for the benefit of one director, possibly at the
shareholders' expense. The determining factor should be whether the
agreement primarily serves a corporate purpose (i.e. the interest of the
shareholders), or a private purpose of one or more directors.
An alternative method of limitation would be to confine the rule of
Dillon to the holding that it is illegal "[t]o allow the removal of one
director, without cause, by another director through the vehicle of obtaining a secret, undated resignation as a quidpro quo for allowing an uncontested reelection to the Board ..
."50 In those cases which did not
involve such an agreement, the rule would have no force.
Thus, while it is beyond doubt that the rule enunciated in Dillon v.
Berg is valid for that particular case, care must be taken to limit its
application. If the rule is employed in cases that lack Dillon's peculiar
circumstances, the validity of the acts of countless boards may be called
into question. If the rule is construed broadly, it will be at the peril of
"normal and desirable" business practices and at the risk of inciting
litigation.
GREGORY JAMES DIGEL

18305 F.2d at 580 (Clark,
"Id. at 579.
50326 F. Supp. at 1225.

J., concurring).

